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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the incentive eﬀects of the level of damages and the
doctrine of laches in a model of patent dispute over sequential innovations.
When innovation is sequential, the owner of a patent over the first innovation
is often entitled to collect revenues from the second (follow-on) innovation.
This occurs for example when the second innovation is an application of the
first one. The patentholder can litigate and collect damages to be compen-
sated for infringement, and then negotiate with the infringer to obtain royal-
ties if the infringer wants to continue exploiting the patent. The doctrine of
laches punishes the patentholder if she delayed litigation after infringement
has begun: the patentholder is not entitled to get damages for infringement
that occured during the delay period. However, the patentholder can still en-
force her patent and thus collect licensing revenues if the infringer wishes to
continue exploiting the patent1. I propose a model which incorporates these
features. I investigate the eﬀects of the damages and the doctrine of laches on
the timing of investment by the infringer and the timing of litigation by the
patentholder. I show that the doctrine not only aﬀects the timing of litiga-
tion, but also and perhaps most importantly, the timing of investment in the
follow-on innovation. I also derive, inter alia, two counterintuitive results:
first, an increase in the level of compensatory damages can hurt the paten-
tholder and second, the doctrine of laches, meant to protect the infringer,
can hurt him2. Overall, my analysis suggests that it is worthwhile to deepen
our understanding of legal mechanisms that play a role in patent disputes
when innovation is sequential: in fine, these mechanisms impact innovation
incentives.
1The ”doctrine of laches” diﬀers from the ”doctrine of estoppel” analyzed in a com-
panion paper in two ways. First, the application of the doctrine of estoppel has more
requirements than a mere delay. Second, if these requirements of the ”doctrine of estop-
pel”are fulfilled, the patent is completely unenforceable: the patentholder cannot collect
any revenue from the infringer. Under the requirements of the ”doctrine of laches”, the
patent remains enforceable: the patentholder does not collect revenues for infringement
that occured during the delay period (damages) but she collects revenues for future act
of infringement (licensing revenues if the infringer wants to continue using the patented
invention).
2The rationale for these results diﬀer from similar results obtained in a companion
paper about the doctrine of estoppel.
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It has long been acknowledged that innovations build on previous ones.
Consider for example the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. Medicines
are often developed by using previously patented innovations, such as the
PCR technology for replicating DNA in test tubes (see Schankerman and
Scotchmer (2001) for an extensive list of such ”research tools”). The software
industry also illustrates this phenomenon. Bessen and Maskin (2002) argue
that previously patented technologies required to develop a follow-on tech-
nology hinder innovation in industries where innovation is complementary
and sequential. The reason is that the follow-on innovator typically needs
to obtain the right to use the previously patented innovation. When such a
right is not secured by a licensing agreement prior to engaging in research
and development, the infringer may find himself involved in a legal dispute
ex-post. Indeed, the patentholder is entitled to litigate and collect damages
to be compensated for infringement. It is not surprising that a follow-on
innovator refrains from engaging in ex-ante licensing agreements with paten-
tholders. Chang (1995) and Denicolo` (2002) make this assumption, as I do.
One reason is that there are several patents that may be infringed and it is
too costly (both in terms of time and money) to secure a license for each
patent before any success in research and development (patent pools try to
alleviate this problem). Another reason is that the follower is unwilling to
engage in a costly ex-ante bargaining process because he expects to be able
to ”invent around” the patent when conducting R&D3. Finally, by not sign-
ing an ex-ante licensing agreement, the follower avoids to disclose his idea to
the patentholder who may otherwise be able to steal it and bring a product
to the market first4. The patent literature dealing with sequential innova-
tion often abstracts from specific legal factors aﬀecting patent disputes5. By
focusing on some of these determinants (the doctrine of laches, the level of
compensatory damages and litigation costs), this paper aims at filling this
gap.
In this paper, a firm has an idea which can be developed into a com-
mercializable product at a given (sunk) cost. Development requires using
a previously patented technology and ex-ante agreements with the paten-
3As such, this does not explain that a licensing agreement is not signed: the easier it
is for the infringer (follow-on innovator) to invent around the patent, the higher his share
of the surplus in the bargaining agreement. However, if this bargaining process is costly,
the infringer may prefer to avoid it.
4Chang (1995) also discusses other reasons why ex-ante agreements may not be signed.
5Exceptions are Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001) or Llobet (2003).
2
tholder are ruled out. If this firm (called the infringer) invests and infringes
the patent, the patentholder can litigate and collect damages ex-post. No-
tice that infringement does not reduce the patentholder’s profit. However,
its patent allows the patentholder to collect part of the revenues earned by
the infringer. Litigation is costly as well, for both the infringer and the
patentholder. Given this basic set-up, I introduce uncertainty regarding the
demand for the innovation that the infringer wishes to develop. There are two
periods and uncertainty is revealed at the end of the first period : with a given
probability, a demand exists for the innovation and revenues are generated
from which the patentholder can collect damages. With the complementary
probability there is no demand and no revenues: the patentholder do not col-
lect any damages (I rule out punitive damages). The infringer is the leader
and decides when to invest: before uncertainty is resolved (at the beginning
of period 1) or after (at the beginning of period 2). The patentholder is a
follower and litigates only if infringement occured. If the infringer invested
at the beginning of period 1, the patentholder decides whether she litigates
immediately (i.e before uncertainty is resolved) or she delays until period
2 (when uncertainty is resolved). This delayed litigation is punished if the
doctrine of laches applies: the patentholder cannot get damages for infringe-
ment that occured in the first period. However, she still can get licensing
revenues from the second period profit if the infringer continues to produce
his infringing product.
My main results are:
• Counterintuitively, an increase in the patentholder’s compensation can
make her worse-oﬀ. Also counter-intuitively, the doctrine of laches can
hurt the infringer, although it is designed to protect him.
• The doctrine of laches triggers earlier litigation and decreases the like-
lihood of litigation.
• An increase in the patentholder’s compensation can delay or speed-up
investment.
• The doctrine of laches can have opposite eﬀects on the timing of the
infringing investment. Depending on the model’s parameters, it can
speed-up or delay investment. It can also deter or spur investment.
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¥ The doctrine of laches in brief: legal requirements.
The doctrine of laches is a ”defense” available to the infringer. That
means that the infringer can invoke the doctrine to defend himself if the
patentholder litigates him. To be successful with this defense, the infringer
needs to show that the patentholder delayed litigation and that this delay
caused a prejudice. If the Court is convinced, the punishment for the paten-
tholder is simple: she cannot obtain damages for infringement that occured
during the delay period. However, the patent is still enforceable. Thus,
the patentholder can collect damages for infringement occuring after litiga-
tion started, and she can collect licensing revenues if the infringer wants to
continue producing his infringing product. Legal information about the doc-
trine of laches can be found from various sources. A particularly clear and
well illustrated paper is Szendro (2002). As emphasized by Szendro (2002),
”patentees against whom the laches defense has been successfully invoked
are barred from collecting only those damages that accrued prior to filing
suit. Patentees may recover damages flowing from infringing activity con-
duct that takes place after commencement of an infringment action, even
where the accused infringer successfully invokes the laches defense. Accord-
ingly, interposition of laches does not permit the alledged infringer to lawfully
continue the infringing conduct. Continued infringement remains the subject
of litigation that may require settlement, entering into licensing agreements
that require the payment of royalties to the patentee (...)”.
¥ Related literature. To the best of my knowledge, my paper is the first
to investigates the joint eﬀect of the level of damages and the doctrine of
laches on the incentives to infringe and litigate. Schankerman and Scotch-
mer (2001) analyze the doctrine of laches but assume that the doctrine pre-
vents a patentholder from obtaining an injunction (they do not investigate
the doctrine in the case where the patentholder is compensated by damages).
This is at odds with the facts: the doctrine of laches allows the patentholder
to get an injunction to prevent future infringement. Its role is only to pre-
vent the patentholder from collecting damages for infringement that occured
during the delay period. My model is also related to Choi (1998). As in
Choi, both the timing of infringement and the timing of litigation are en-
dogenized. Otherwise, my approach is substantially diﬀerent in the issues
investigated and the results obtained. In Choi (1998), there is an incumbent
patentholder and two entrants. Entry reduces the profit of the patentholder.
The first litigation reveals whether the patent is valid or not. As a result, a
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waiting game can arise where the two entrants expect the other one to pay
the cost of entry first (the other one entering only if the patent is invalid).
But a ”preemption game” can arise as well, because for some parameter
values, the patentholder has an incentive not to litigate the first entrant in
order not to reveal validity information to the second entrant. By contrast,
in my model, infringement creates new revenues to be shared between the
patentholder and the infringer (there is no profit erosion). The timing of
litigation is driven by litigation costs and uncertainty regarding the prof-
itability of the infringing innovation. The timing of infringement is aﬀected
by the sunk investment cost and uncertainty regarding the profitability of
the innovation. The revelation of patent validity plays no role. Hence, the
dynamics of my model do not rely on the same economic forces as in Choi
(1998). Most importantly, my inquiry focuses on the doctrine of laches. I
solve the model under two regimes, one where the doctrine applies and one
where it does not, and I analyze the eﬀect of the doctrine on players’ welfare,
on litigation timing and infringement timing. This is not the focus of Choi
who assumes away the application of the doctrine of laches. More broadly,
my paper is related to a mushrooming literature which attempts to deepen
our understanding of patent disputes by analyzing the economic impacts of
various doctrines: Lanjouw and Lerner (2001) (the doctrine of ”preliminary
injunctions”), Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001) (the doctrines of ”un-
just enrichment”, ”lost profit” and ”laches”), Llobet (2003) (the ”doctrine of
equivalents”), Anton and Yao (2004) (the doctrine of ”lost profit”), Aoki and
Small (2004) (the doctrine of ”essential facilities”), Langinier and Marcoul
(2005) (the doctrine of ”contributory infringement”).
¥ A roadmap. In section 2, I present the main assumptions of the
model (players, actions, payoﬀs and timing). In section 3, I conduct the
equilibrium analysis. I solve the game under two legal regimes: a regime
where the doctrine of laches does not apply and a regime where the doctrine
applies. This enables me to propose a comparison of the two regimes in a
later section. Despite the conceptual simplicity of the model, the equilibrium
analysis is long and sometimes cumbersome. This is because there are several
”scenarios” to analyze, depending on the parameters of the model. In order
to streamline the display of the investigation, I relegate many steps of this
analysis to the Appendix. From this analysis, I am able to characterize the
equilibrium outcomes of the game under both regimes. I use graphics that
illustrate the diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes. In the last two sections, I use
5
these figures to derive economic insights: In section 4, I analyze the eﬀect
of strengthening the patentholder’s compensation. In section 5, I analyze
the eﬀects of the doctrine of laches compared to a regime where it does not
apply. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model setting
¥ Players, actions, payoﬀs.
I consider two players, a patentholder (she) labelled H and a potential
infringer (he) labelled I. At the outset, the patentholder has a patent on an
innovationA and the potential infringer is able to develop an innovative prod-
uct B. I do not consider investment in obtaining innovation A and simply
assume that a patent exists6. The previously patented innovation is required
as an input in the development of the new product B. This product, if de-
veloped by the infringer, does not compete away the patentholder’s profit.
However, because of her patent, the patentholder can collect damages. Such
a situation of ”sequential innovations” is common in practice and has been
extensively scrutinized in the economic literature (Matutes, Regibeau and
Rockett (1996); Schankermann and Scotchmer (2001)). For example, think
of the patentholder as a biotechnology firm owning a patent on a research
tool like a gene sequence (A), and the infringer as a pharmaceutical company
contemplating developing a new drug (B) against a specific disease. If the
development of this drug requires the use of the gene sequence, there is a
risk of infringement. Like Chang (1995) or Denicolo (2000), I assume that
ex-ante licensing is impossible. For example, the infringer could fear that the
patentholder would ”steal” his idea.
There are two periods. To simplify the problem, I assume no discounting
between periods. At the beginning of period 1, there is uncertainty regarding
whether innovation B will generate any profit. Specifically, with probability
α the profit from B will be π (in both periods), whereas with probability
6This is a common feature of many models of patent litigation. For some exceptions,
see Llobet (2003) or Aoki and Hu (2003).
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1 − α, the profit will be zero (in both periods). Uncertainty is resolved at
the end of the first period.
probability period 1 period 2
profit from product B α π π
profit from product B (1− α) 0 0
• The infringer is the leader in the game. He has to decide whether
to invest before uncertainty is resolved (i.e. at the beginning of period
1) or after (i.e. at the beginning of period 2). Investment is a sunk
cost K ∈ [0,+∞). Delaying has a cost: if the infringer prefers to delay
investment until uncertainty is resolved, and the venture turns out to
be profitable, first period profit is foregone. But delaying also has a
benefit: if the venture is unprofitable (which occurs with probability
1 − α), K is ”saved”. Hence, the infringer faces a simple problem of
investment under uncertainty.
• The patentholder is a follower. Conditional on observing infringe-
ment of her patent, she can litigate to obtain damages that will com-
pensate her for the loss of licensing revenues she would have obtained,
had an ex-ante licensing agreement been signed. The Court decides
whether the patent is valid. It is valid with exogenous probability θ.
Then, damages can be awarded. I assume the calculation of damages
goes as follows. The Court allows the patentholder to collect a share of
the profit earned by the infringer during the period of infringement. In
practice, this method of compensation is called compensation by ”lost
profit” or ”reasonable royalty” (see Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United
States Plywood Corp., 38 F. Supp. 1116, 1970). The idea is to give
the patentholder a level of royalty that she would have gotten, had an
ex-ante licensing agreement been signed. The share of π awarded by
the Court is denoted ρ. Thus the patentholder gets ρπ as damages for
infringement in a given period. This way of modeling damages can be
found in Langinier and Marcoul (2005) (who investigates the doctrine
of contributory infringement). Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001) or
Anton and Yao (2004) also analyze the ”reasonable royalty” rule.
In practice, once the Court has calculated damages for infringement that
occured prior to litigation, the patentholder and the infringer are free to bar-
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gain to share future revenues. Indeed, it is in the best interest of both parties
that the ”infringer” continues to produce his innovation, since it generates a
profit that can be shared. I assume that if the infringer invested in period
1 while the patentholder litigated in period 2, then the patentholder gets ρπ
as damages for period 1 infringement and ρπ as licensing revenues for the
second period as well.7
I define θρ , δ and call δ the ”compensatory rule”. More accurately, it is
the ”expected compensatory rule”, since θ is the probability that the patent
is valid (and so the probability that the patentholder gets compensated).
Given this compensatory rule, the patentholder has to decide whether he
litigates. Litigation costs c for both players. The allocation of litigation costs
follows the American rule whereby each party pays its own expenditures for
litigation. If the infringer invested in period 1, the patentholder herself faces
a ”real option problem”. She can litigate immediately (i.e in period 1) before
uncertainty is resolved, or she can delay litigation until period 2. If she delays
litigation until period 2, she obtains damages for infringement that occured
in period 1 only if the doctrine of laches does not apply. I assume that the
profit from the innovation is high enough compared to the cost of litigation:
π ≥ 6c. This is a simplifying assumption aiming at reducing the number
of scenarios to analyze. Indeed, there is already an important number of
scenarios. Increasing this number would hardly yield additional economic
insights but it would considerably increase the length of the analysis.
¥ Legal regimes: the ”no laches” and the ”laches” regimes
I solve the game under two alternative regimes. In the first regime (the
”no laches regime”, labelled N), the doctrine of laches does not apply. In
the second regime (the ”laches regime”, labelled L), the doctrine of laches
applies. The diﬀerence between these two regimes matters only when the
infringer invested in period 1 and the patentholder delayed litigation until
period 2. In that case:
• In the ”no laches regime”: the infringer cannot invoke the doctrine of
laches and so the patentholder gets damages for period 1 infringement
(she is not punished for having delayed litigation).
• In the ”laches regime”: the infringer can invoke the doctrine of laches.
If he does so, the patentholder is punished for having delayed litigation
7If the doctrine of laches does not apply.
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and cannot obtain damages for period 1 infringement. However, she can
get licensing revenues for future exploitation of her patent. Under the
assumptions of the model, she does not get damages ρπ for infringement
in period 1, but she gets ρπ as licensing revenues to compensate for
exploitation of her patent in period 2.
Notice that this way of modeling the doctrine of laches is consistent with
Szendro’s definition of the doctrine8. In particular, the doctrine of laches
does not make the patent unenforceable. It punishes the patentholder who
delayed simply by preventing her to recover damages for the delay period.
¥ Timing of the game
The timing in period 1 is as follows:
1) The potential infringer decides whether to invest in period 1 or to delay
his decision until uncertainty is resolved.
2) If the infringer invested in period 1, the patentholder decides whether
to litigate early or to wait until demand uncertainty is resolved.
3) Uncertainty is resolved.
In period 2, the timing of the game depends on period 1’s actions:
If the infringer delayed investment until date 2, he will invest whenever
the demand turns out to be high enough. Conditional on infringement, the
patentholder litigates in period 2 or renunciates.
If the infringer invested in period 1 but the patentholder delayed litiga-
tion, she can litigate at the beginning of period 2.
This game is represented in extensive form in Figure 1.
8proposed in the introduction.
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Infringer I
Patentholder H
I
H H H
Period 1
Period 2
α α αα−1 α−1 α−1
Invests in period 1Does not invest in period 1
Litigates in period 1 Does not litigate in period 1
Invests in 
period 2
Does not
invest in 
period 2
Move by nature
litigates does not
litigate litigates does notlitigate
litigates does not
litigate
H
litigates does not
litigate
I
Does not
invest in 
period 2
Invests in 
period 2
en
d
en
d
Figure 1: Game tree
¥ Notation.
I denote by U ri,t(a) player i’s payoﬀ (for i = H, I) at time t ∈ {1, 2} in
regime r ∈ {N,L} when action a ∈ Ai is chosen. The infringer’s action set
if given by AI = {i, n} and the patentholder’s action set is AH = {l, nl}. i
means ”investment”, nmeans ”no investment”, l means ”litigation” nl means
”no litigation”.
3 Equilibrium analysis
This two-period game is solved by backward induction and the solution con-
cept is the subgame perfect equilibrium. First, in section 3.1, I analyze
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the infringer’s ”defense strategy” if the patentholder litigates. By ”defense
strategy”, I mean whether the infringer invokes the doctrine of laches or not.
Then, moving one step backward, I investigate in section 3.2 the paten-
tholder’s litigation decision. This decision depends, inter alia, on the period
in which the infringer invested. Facing infringement, the patentholder has to
decide whether and when to litigate. Finally, in section 3.3, I analyze the
infringer’s investment decision. He himself has to decide whether and when
to invest.
Section 3 is mainly concerned by the technical analysis of the model.
Because this analysis turns out to be cumbersome, many analytical steps are
proposed in the Appendix.
3.1 The defense decision
I start by analyzing the condition for the infringer to invoke the doctrine of
laches. It is possible to invoke the doctrine only when the infringer invested in
period 1 and the patentholder delayed litigation until period 2. The doctrine
of laches will bar the patentholder from collecting period 1’s damages. The
infringer invokes the doctrine provided his payoﬀ is higher than his payoﬀ
without invoking it:9
if doctrine of laches invokedz }| {
π|{z}
period 1 profit
+ θ(1− ρ)π + (1− θ)π| {z }
period 2 profit
≥
if doctrine of laches not invokedz }| {
θ(1− ρ)π + (1− θ)π| {z }
period 1 profit
+ θ(1− ρ)π + (1− θ)π| {z }
period 2 profit
.
If the doctrine is invoked (left-hand side), the infringer keeps the first
period profit but if the patent is valid (with probability θ), he gives a share
ρ from the second period profit to the patentholder. If the doctrine is not
invoked (right-hand side), he gives a share ρ from both period 1 and period
2 profits, if the patent is valid. Given that δ , θρ, this expression can be
rewritten as:
if doctrine of laches invokedz }| {
(2− δ)π ≥
if doctrine of laches not invokedz }| {
(2− 2δ)π .
Clearly this inequality always holds.
9abstracting from the litigation costs which could be added to both sides of the in-
equality.
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Lemma 1 Invoking the doctrine of laches as a defense argument is a dom-
inant strategy for the infringer.
Hence the infringer invokes the doctrine of laches whenever feasible. Thus,
the patentholder cannot obtain compensatory damages for infringement that
occured in period 1. Given this intuitive result, I now analyze the paten-
tholder’s litigation decision.
3.2 Litigation timing by the patentholder
The patentholder observes that infringement has occured and has to decide
whether she litigates. There are two possibilities. First, the infringer delayed
investment until uncertainty was resolved and invested in period 2. In that
case, the patentholder decides in period 2 whether she litigates or not. The
other possibility is that the infringer invested in period 1. In that case, the
patentholder decides whether to litigate immediately, i.e. in period 1, or
to delay litigation until period 2. The main benefit of delaying litigation is
that litigation costs are saved if the infringing venture does not generate any
demand. Assuming the infringer invested in period 1, I analyze in section
3.2.1 the patentholder’s decision to litigate in the ”no laches regime”. In
section 3.2.2, I analyze her decision in the ”laches regime”. Finally, in
section 3.2.3, I analyze her decision if the infringer invested in period 2.
In the latter case, there is no distinction between the ”laches” and the ”no
laches” regimes.
3.2.1 The patentholder’s decision in the ”no laches regime”
Suppose the infringer invested in period 1. Observing infringement, the
patentholder has to decide whether she litigates and when she litigates.
Suppose the patentholder delayed litigation until period 2. She litigates
in period 2 provided infringement of her patent generated revenues from
which she can obtain royalties as damages. This occurs with probability α.
Since the doctrine of laches does not apply, she is not ”punished” for her
delay and, if her patent is valid, she collects damages for infringement that
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occured in period 1, in addition to damages for period 2 infringement. Given
the litigation cost c, her payoﬀ is10:
UNH,2(l) = θ (ρπ + ρπ)− c = 2δπ − c. (1)
With probability θ the patent is valid and the Court awards a share ρ of
both period 1 and period 2 profits to the patentholder. Notice that UNH,2(l)
is increasing in δ (the compensatory rule) and decreasing in c (the litigation
cost). It follows that there exists a value δ above which it is profitable to
litigate. Denoting δN this value (the subscript N referring to the ”no laches
regime”):
UNH,2(l) = 2δπ − c
½
< 0 if δ < δN , c2π
≥ 0 if δ ≥ δN , c2π .
(2)
In period 1, the patentholder computes her payoﬀ if she does not litigate
immediately, anticipating her period 2 net payoﬀ11:
UNH,1(nl) =
½
0 if δ < δN , c2π
α (2δπ − c) if δ ≥ δN , c2π .
(3)
The expression (3) is derived from expression (2). Indeed, if δ < δN , the
patentholder would not litigate in period 2 (otherwise her net payoﬀ would
be negative according to (2)). As a result, if she does not litigate in period 1
either, she gets 0. And if δ ≥ δN , she would litigate in period 2 if and only if
there is a demand for the infringer’s product, which occurs with probability
α. In that case, she gets 2δπ − c.
In period 1, the patentholder also computes her payoﬀ if she litigates
immediately:
UNH,1(l) = −c+ θ [α (2ρπ)] , −c+ α2δπ. (4)
Indeed, she has to pay the litigation cost c and if her patent is valid (with
probability θ), she gets a share ρ from both period 1 and period 2 profits.
To determine the timing of litigation, I compare (3) and (4). Obviously, if
δ ≥ δN , UNH,1(nl) ≥ UNH,1(l): the patentholder is strictly better-oﬀ if she delays
10In expression (1), I use the notation defined in section 2. Hence, UNH,2(l) denotes the
net payoﬀ for the patentholder (denoted by subscript H), in period 2 (subscript 2), in the
”no laches regime” (superscript N). l means that the patentholder’s action is litigation.
11Again, I follow the notation defined in section 2. UNH,1(nl) is the patentholder’s ex-
pected payoﬀ in the no laches regime if she does not litigate (nl) in period 1.
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litigation as she ”saves” litigation costs in case the infringing product does
not generate any revenue. If δ < δN , litigating in period 2 is unprofitable
since 2δπ − c < 0. This implies that α2δπ − c < 0 as well, since α ∈ [0, 1].
By (4), this last inequality means that litigation in period 1 is unprofitable
as well.
I summarize this analysis by the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (litigation timing in the ”no laches regime” when the
infringer invested in period 1). For δ ∈ [δN , 1], the patentholder delays
litigation. For δ ∈ [0, δN ], litigation is unprofitable, either in period 1 or in
period 2.
Still assuming that the infringer invested in period 1, I now turn to the
case where the doctrine of laches applies. This means that the patentholder is
punished if she delays litigation until period 2: she does not obtain damages
for infringement that occurred in the first period. This should aﬀect the
timing of litigation, compared to the previous section.
3.2.2 The patentholder’s decision in the ”laches regime”
Suppose again that the infringer invested in period 1. In solving the paten-
tholder’s problem, I use the same methodology I used for the ”laches regime”
above.
Suppose first the patenholder delays litigation until uncertainty is re-
solved. She litigates in period 2 provided this is profitable. Since the doctrine
of laches applies, she obtains royalties for period 2, but no damage royalties
for period 1. Her net litigation payoﬀ in period 2 is thus:
ULH,2(l) = θρπ − c , δπ − c. (5)
Indeed, with probability θ the patent is valid and the Court allows the
patentholder to get a share ρ of the forthcoming second period profit. Notice
that this net payoﬀ diﬀers from the net payoﬀ found in equation (2) where
the doctrine of laches did not apply. When the doctrine of laches applies, the
net payoﬀ from delayed litigation is lower since the first-period damages are
forgone. This can be seen by comparing (1) and (5). ULH,2(l) is increasing in
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δ and decreasing in c. Hence, there exists a value δ above which litigation is
profitable. Denoting δL this value (the subscript L referring to the ”laches
regime”):
ULH,2(l)
½
< 0 if δ < δL , cπ
= δπ − c ≥ 0 if δ ≥ δL , cπ .
(6)
In period 1, the patentholder computes her payoﬀ if she does not litigate
immediately, anticipating her period 2 net payoﬀ:
ULH,1(nl) =
½
0 if δ < δL , cπ
α(δπ − c) if δ ≥ δL , cπ .
(7)
The expressions in (7) come from (6). Indeed, if δ < δL, she would not
litigate in period 2 (since her net payoﬀ would be negative according to (6)).
Hence, if she does not litigate in period 1 either, she obtains 0. And if δ ≥ δL,
she would litigate in period 2, but only if the infringing venture generates
revenues, which occurs with probability α. In that case, she gets δπ − c.
The patentholder also computes her net payoﬀ if she litigates immediately
(i.e. in period 1):
ULH,1(l) = −c+ θ [α(2ρπ)] , −c+ α2δπ. (8)
She has to pay the litigation cost c and if her patent is valid (with prob-
ability θ) she gets a share ρ from both period 1 and period 2 profits.
The next step consists in determining a condition on δ (the compensatory
rule) such that ULH,1(l) ≥ ULH,1(nl), where these net payoﬀs are given by (7)
and (8). Because the net payoﬀ ULH,1(nl) diﬀers depending whether δ < δL
or δ ≥ δL, I distinguish between these two cases. ”Case 1” means that
δ ∈ [0, δL] and ”case 2” means that δ ∈ [δL, 1].
¥ Case 1: δ ∈ [0, δL]. On this interval, given (7), ULH,1(nl) = 0.
It follows that the condition ULH,1(l) ≥ ULH,1(nl) is equivalent to ULH,1(l) ≥ 0.
Using (8), this condition holds if and only if −c+ α2δπ ≥ 0 or:
δ ≥ c
2απ , δL. (9)
Notice that δL ≤ δL if and only if α ≥ 12 . From that remark, I can
conclude:
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• If α < 1
2
, then δL > δL. This implies that for any δ ∈ [0, δL], δ < δL.
So, (9) is violated and ULH,1(l) ≥ 0 does not hold: the patentholder does
not litigate.
• If α ≥ 1
2
, then δL ≤ δL. This implies that (9) holds for some δ ∈ [0, δL].
More accurately, for δ < δL, (9) does not hold and the patentholder
does not litigate. But for δ ∈ [δL, δL], (9) holds and so the patentholder
litigates in period 1.
¥ Case 2: δ ∈ [δL, 1]. On this interval, using (7) and (8),
ULH,1(l) ≥ ULH,1(nl) if and only if −c+ α2δπ ≥ α(δπ − c) or:
δ ≥ (1− α)cαπ , δL. (10)
Proceeding as I did above, notice that δL ≥ δL if and only if α ≤ 12 . From
that remark, I can conclude:
• If α ≤ 1
2
, then δL ≥ δL. This implies that for all δ ∈ [δL, 1], we have the
following partition. If δ ∈ [δL, δL], condition (10) is violated and so the
patentholder delays litigation. And if δ ∈ [δL, 1], condition (10) holds
and the patentholder litigates in period 1.
• If α > 1
2
, then δL < δL. This implies that for all δ ∈ [δL, 1], δ ≥ δL. So,
condition (10) holds and the patentholder litigates in period 1.
The following lemma summarizes these findings:
Lemma 3 (Litigation timing in the ”laches regime” when the in-
fringer invested in period 1).
• If the probability of commercial success is high (α ≥ 1
2
), the patentholder
does not litigate when δ ∈ [0, δL] and litigates early for δ ∈ [δL, 1].
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• If the probabililty of commercial success is intermediary (α ∈ [ c
c+π ,
1
2
)),
the patentholder does not litigate when δ ∈ [0, δL], delays litigation for
δ ∈ [δL, δL] and litigates early for δ ∈ [δL, 1].
• If the probability of success is low (α ∈ [0, c
c+π )), the patentholder does
not litigate when δ ∈ [0, δL] and delays litigation when δ ∈ [δL, 1].
Finally, I analyze the case where the infringer invested in period 2.
3.2.3 Litigation when the infringer invested in period 2
Suppose now that the infringer delayed investment. Then the regime is ir-
relevant. The patentholder can only litigate in period 2 and uncertainty is
resolved at that time. She litigates provided this is profitable i.e. provided
δπ ≥ c or
δ ≥ cπ , δL.
Notice that the cutoﬀ value δ above which litigation occurs is identical to
the cutoﬀ value identified in the ”laches regime”.
Lemma 4 (Litigation timing when the infringer invested in period
2). When the infringer delayed investment until period 2, the patentholder
litigates if and only if the compensatory rule is high enough i.e δ ≥ cπ = δL.
The various equilibrium actions of the patentholder are represented in
Figure 2. The thick solid lines represent boundaries between diﬀerent regions
where a particular litigation strategy occurs in equilibrium. The case where
the infringer invested in period 2 is represented by the right-hand-side
graphic. Following lemma 4, in the (α, δ) space, the boundary value δL
separates a region where litigation occurs from a region where it does not
occur. Intuitively, an increase in the compensatory rule δ yields a switch from
”no litigation” to ”litigation”, for a given level of the litigation cost. The case
where the infringer invested in period 1 is represented by the two left-hand-
side graphics. Notice that I distinguish between the ”no laches regime”
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(bottom graphic) and the ”laches regime” (top graphic). The boundary αL is
the inverse of δL and αL is the inverse of δL12. Comparing the bottom graphic
with the top graphic shows the main eﬀects of the doctrine of laches on the
patentholder’s litigation strategy. These eﬀects are stated in proposition 1
below.
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Figure 2: Litigation in either regime
Proposition 5 (the doctrine of laches and litigation). The doctrine
of laches has two possible eﬀects on litigation compared to a regime where it
does not apply:
• first, it increases the likelihood of early litigation,
12Since δL = c2απ it follows that αL =
c
2δπ . And since δL =
(1−α)c
2π it follows that αL
= cδπ+c . Both αL and αL are decreasing in δ and they intersect at δ =
c
π = δL.
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• second, it decreases the likelihood of litigation.
Proof. The proof is straigthforward upon inspection of the cutoﬀ values.
Both results in proposition 1 are intuitive. The first result is the most ex-
pected: because the doctrine of laches punishes the patentholder who delays
by reducing the amount of damages she can recover, it forces some paten-
tholders to react in a timely manner (i.e. in period 1). The second result
comes from the fact that litigation is costly and there is uncertainty about
whether the infringing innovation will be profitable. The patentholder herself
faces a real option problem: if she delays litigation, and infringement turns
out to be unprofitable, she saves litigation costs. But the interposition of
the doctrine of laches forces her to litigate earlier, that is, before uncertainty
is resolved. For any given c and α, and a low enough damage D, litigating
early will be non profitable and so litigation will be deterred.
Now, I move one step backward and I investigate the infringer’s decision.
He faces a ”real option” problem as well in the sense that he can invest in
period 1 or in period 2 (or not at all). In making his decision, the infringer
anticipates how the patentholder will react. It means that he anticipates
whether the patentholder will litigate and if she does, in which period it
happens.
3.3 Investment timing by the infringer
As for litigation, I distinguish between the two regimes. First, in section
3.3.1, I analyze the investment decision in the ”no laches regime”. Then,
in section 3.3.2, I analyze the investment decision in the ”laches regime”.
In both cases, diﬀerent scenarios must be analyzed depending on the values
of the parameters. Displaying the analysis for every scenarios in this section
would be cumbersome and would only slow down the progression towards
deriving economic insights. As a result, part of the necessary analytical
steps of this section are given in Appendix A. Also, in section 3, I shall
assume that the probability that the innovation is profitable is high enough,
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namely α ≥ 1
2
. This is clearly a simplifying assumption. Like the previous
simplifying assumption (π ≥ 6c), it aims at reducing the number of scenarios
to investigate. Notice that when α ≥ 1
2
, the two eﬀects of the doctrine of
laches on litigation are still captured: the doctrine induces earlier litigation
or it deters litigation. This can be seen by comparing the two left-hand side
graphics in Figure 2. Hence, the essential economic insights regarding the
influence of these two eﬀects on the timing of investment can be derived when
α ≥ 1
2
.
3.3.1 The infringer’s decision in the ”no laches regime”
At the beginning of period 1, the infringer must decide whether and when
he invests (and thereby infringes the patent). He knows that the doctrine of
laches does not apply. He anticipates the patentholder’s litigation strategy
if he invests in period 1 (represented by the left-hand-side ”bottom graphic”
in Figure 2). He also anticipates the patentholder’s litigation strategy when
he invests in period 2 (represented by the right-hand side graphic in Figure
2). Based on these two graphics, there are three scenarios to consider:
• Scenario 1: δ ∈ [δL, 1]. The infringer faces litigation in period 2 re-
gardless of the timing of investment.
• Scenario 2: δ ∈ [δN , δL]. The infringer will not face litigation if he
invests in period 2. However, he will face litigation in period 2 if he
invests in period 1.
• Scenario 3: δ ∈ [0, δN ]. The infringer will never face litigation.
For each scenario, the infringer has to decide whether and when to in-
vest. The methodology used to solve this problem is similar to that used for
analyzing the patentholder’s litigation decision. Because I repeat the same
analytical steps for all three scenarios, the details of the reasoning for sce-
narios 2 and 3 is reported in Appendix A.1. Here, I only report the detailed
analysis for scenario 1. For each scenario, I conclude by a lemma where I
summarize the infringer’s investment decision (lemmas 5, 6 and 7) Also, it is
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useful to define here two values that play a role in the forthcoming analysis:bα = π
2(π−c) and
bbα = π
2π−3c .
¥ Scenario 1. δ ∈ [δL, 1].
Suppose the infringer delays investment until uncertainty is resolved. He
invests in period 2 provided that there is a demand for his product. This
occurs with probability α. If he invests in period 2, his net payoﬀ is:
UNI,2(i) = −K − c+ θ(1− ρ)π + (1− θ)π , −K − c+ π(1− δ). (11)
Because the infringer knows that the patentholder will litigate in period 2
he will face litigation cost c in addition to the sunk investment cost K.With
probability θ the patent is valid and the patentholder collects a share ρ of
second period profit π. With probability 1− θ the patent is invalid. Notice
that UNI,2(i) is increasing in π and 1− δ but is decreasing in K. Hence, there
exists a value of K below which investment is profitable. Denoting KN,1 this
value (N is for the ”no laches regime” and 1 refers to scenario 1) it follows
that:
UNI,2(i) = −K − c+ π(1− δ)
½
< 0 if K > KN,1 , π(1− δ)− c
≥ 0 if K ≤ KN,1 , π(1− δ)− c.
(12)
In period 1, the infringer can compute his payoﬀ if he does not invest in
period 1:
UNI,1(n) =
½
0 if K > KN,1 , π(1− δ)− c
α [π(1− δ)− c−K] if K ≤ KN,1 , π(1− δ)− c.
(13)
If K > KN,1, the infringer would not invest in period 2. So, if he does
not invest in period 1, he gets 0. If K ≤ KN,1, the infringer would invest
in period 2 if he does not invest in period 1, provided the demand for his
product exists. This occurs with probability α.
The payoﬀ from investing in period 1 is:
UNI,1(i) = −K + α [θ2π(1− ρ) + (1− θ)2π − c] , −K + {α [2π(1− δ)− c]} .
(14)
Indeed, if he invests in period 1, the infringer faces litigation in period
2, provided the demand for the infringing products exists. This occurs with
21
probability α. Then, with probability θ the patent is valid and the paten-
tholder gets a share ρ of both period 1 and period 2 profits (the sum being
2π). With probability 1 − θ the infringer keeps the sum of the profits for
himself. In any case, he has to pay the litigation cost c.
The next step consists in determining a condition onK such that UNI,1(i) ≥
UNI,1(n) i.e such that the infringer invests in period 1. These two net payoﬀs
are given by (13) and (14). Because UNI,1(n) diﬀers depending whether K >
KN,1 or K ≤ KN,1, I distinguish between these two cases. ”Case 1” means
that K > KN,1 and ”case 2” means that K ≤ KN,1.
¤Case 1. IfK > KN,1, delaying investment is never profitable.
Investing today is profitable as long as UNI,1 ≥ 0 which is equivalent to
K ≤ 2απ(1− δ)− αc , KN,1. (15)
¤ Case 2. If K ≤ KN,1, delaying yields a non-negative profit.
As a result, the infringer will invest today if and only if UNI,1(i) ≥ UNI,1(n) or
K ≤ α
1− απ(1− δ) , KN,1. (16)
From this analysis, I derive the timing of investment by the infringer when
the compensatory rule δ belongs to the interval [δL, 1] (scenario 1). To do
so, I analyze in more depth the respective positions of KN,1, KN,1 and KN,1.
This is done in Appendix A.1 and I obtain the following result:
Lemma 6 Under scenario 1, in the ”no laches” regime, for all K ≤ KN,1,
the infringer invests in period 1 and for all K > KN,1, he does not invest.
The next steps consist in repeating this analysis for the two other inter-
vals: δ ∈ [δN , δL] (scenario 2) and δ ∈ [0, δN ] (scenario 3).
¥ Scenario 2. δ ∈ [δN , δL].
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In Appendix A.1, I detail the analysis of this scenario. The methodology
is identical to that used for scenario 1 above, but the payoﬀs, and thus the
”boundary” values KN,2, KN,2 and KN,2, are diﬀerent:



KN,2 , π
KN,2 , 2απ(1− δ)− αc
KN,2 , α1−α [π(1− 2δ)− c] .
(17)
As shown in Appendix A.1, it is necessary to define two values. First,
the function
•
δ = 2απ−π−αc
2απ such that
•
δ ∈ [δN , δL]. Then the kinked curve
•
K = KN,1 if δ ∈ [δN ,
•
δ] and
•
K = KN,2 if δ ∈ [
•
δ, δL]. I show in Appendix A.1
that the following lemma holds:
Lemma 7 Under scenario 2, in the ”no laches” regime, there are three pos-
sibilities depending on the value of the probability α that the innovation is
profitable.
• If α ∈ (1
2
, bα], the infringer invests in period 1 if K ≤ KN,2. He delays
investment if K ∈ (KN,2, KN,2] and he does not invest if K ≥ KN,2.
• If α ∈ (bα, bbα], the infringer invests in period 1 if K ≤ •K, delays invest-
ment if K ∈ [
•
K,KN,2] and does not invest if K ≥
•
K and K ≥ KN,2.
• If α ∈ (bbα, 1], the infringer invests in period 1 if K ≤ KN,1. Otherwise,
he does not invest.
¥ Scenario 3. δ ∈ [0, δN ].
The analysis of this scenario is detailed in Appendix A.1. For the same
reason as in scenario 2, I report here the three boundaries:



KN,3 , π
KN,3 , 2απ
KN,3 , α1−απ.
(18)
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Lemma 8 Under scenario 3, in the ”no laches” regime, the infringer invests
if K ≤ KN,3. Otherwise he does not invest.
Combining the results concerning the timing of investment (lemmas 5
to 7) with those concerning litigation (lemma 2 and 4), I obtain diﬀerent
equilibrium outcomes as summarized in proposition 2.13
Proposition 9 (Equilibrium outcomes when the doctrine of laches
does not apply). When the probability of commercial success is high (α ≥
1
2
), there are four possible equilibrium outcomes depending on the parameters
of the model:
• The infringer invests in period 1 and the patentholder does not litigate
(EN).
• The infringer invests in period 1 and the patentholder litigates in period
2 (ED).
• The infringer invests in period 2 and the patentholder does not litigate
(DN).
• The infringer does not invest (NO).
The rationale behind the names given to each outcome is as follows. The
first block letter refers to the infringer’s action: E means early investment
(period 1) and D means delayed investment (period 2). The second block
letter refers to the patentholder’s action: E means early litigation (period 1),
D means delayed litigation (period 2), and N means no litigation. Finally,
NO means no investment (and so no litigation). To help figuring out the
diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes in the ”no laches regime”, I present three
figures N1 to N3. The label N refers to the ”no laches” regime. These
figures represent the equilibrium outcomes of the game in the (K, δ) space.
K is the sunk investment cost born by the infringer and δ is the compensation
13In this proposition, I do not detail the exact parameters values for which a particular
equilibrium outcome occurs. The exposition would be tedious otherwise. This is done in
Appendix A.1
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rule which governs the share of the profit obtained by the patentholder. There
are three figures because, when δ ∈ [δN , δL], the equilibrium outcomes are
aﬀected by the value of α. There are three intervals to consider for α ≥ 1
2
:
α ∈
£
1
2
, bα¤, α ∈ (bα, bbα], α ∈ (bbα, 1]. This comes from lemma 6. These figures
will be analyzed more in-depth in sections 4 and 5. However, notice that the
higher the sunk cost K and the higher the patentholder’s compensation (i.e.
the higher is δ), the less often investment occurs. This is intuitive: a higher
K renders investment more costly and a higher δ reduces the share obtained
by the infringer (for all K), thereby making investment less attractive.
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3.3.2 The infringer’s decision in the ”laches regime”
Again, at the beginning of period 1, the infringer has to decide whether and
when he invests. Contrary to the previous section, the doctrine of laches
applies. In making his decision, the infringer anticipates the patentholder’s
reaction if he invests in period 1 (represented by the left-hand-side top graphic
in Figure 2). He also anticipates the patentholder’s reaction if he invests in
period 2 (represented by the right-hand side graphic in Figure 2). Based on
the observation of these two graphics, there are three scenarios to consider
in the ”laches regime”:
• Scenario 1: δ ∈ [δL, 1]. The infringer faces litigation in the period of
investment.
• Scenario 2: δ ∈ [δL, δL]. The infringer will not face litigation if he
delays investment. However, he will face litigation in period 1 if he
invests in period 1.
• Scenario 3: δ ∈ [0, δL].The infringer will never face litigation.
For each scenario, the infringer decides whether and when to invest.
Again, the methodology used to solve this timing problem is identical to
that used in the previous sections. Here, I detail only the first scenario. This
enables me to stress the diﬀerence with the ”no laches regime”. The detailed
analysis of scenarios 2 and 3 is reported in Appendix A.2. Also it is useful to
define here two values that play a role in the analysis below: eα = π+2c
2π andeeα = π+c
2(π−c) .
¥ Scenario 1. δ ∈ [δL, 1].
Suppose the infringer delays investment until period 2. He invests in
period 2 provided that there is a demand for his product. This occurs with
probability α. If he invests in period 2, his net payoﬀ is:
ULI,2(i) = −K − c+ θ(1− ρ)π + (1− θ)π , −K − c+ π(1− δ) (19)
This is unchanged compared to the ”no laches regime”. Indeed, the
regime does not matter when the infringer delays investment until period
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2. As noticed for the ”no laches regime”, ULI,2(i) is increasing in π and 1− δ
but it is decreasing in K. Hence, there is a value K below which the infringer
would invest in period 2. Denoting KL,1 this value (L referring to the ”laches
regime” and 1 to scenario 1), it follows that:
ULI,2(i) = −K − c+ π(1− δ)
½
< 0 if K > KL,1 , π(1− δ)− c
≥ 0 if K ≤ KL,1 , π(1− δ)− c.
(20)
In period 1, the infringer can compute his payoﬀ if he does not invest in
period 1:
ULI,1(n) =
½
0 if K > KL,1
α [−K − c+ π(1− δ)] if K ≤ KL,1.
(21)
This is still identical to the ”no laches regime”.
Also, in period 1, the infringer computes his net payoﬀ if he invests im-
mediately. This payoﬀ diﬀers from the ”no laches regime”:
ULI,1(i) = −K − c+ 2απ(1− δ). (22)
Here, the doctrine of laches encourages the patentholder to litigate in
period 1 if the infringer invests in period 1. As a result, the infringer faces
litigation costs c in period 1, before uncertainty is resolved. In the ”no
laches regime”, the situation was diﬀerent: the patentholder preferred to
delay litigation until period 2 and, as a result, the infringer faced litigation
costs only if a demand for the infringing product turned out to exist, i.e only
with probability α. This diﬀerence plays a crucial role in the analysis of the
doctrine of laches in section 5.
The next step consists in determining a condition onK such that ULI,1(i) ≥
ULI,1(n), that is: such that the infringer prefers to invest in period 1. These
two net payoﬀs are given by (21) and (22). Because ULI,1(n) diﬀers depending
whether K > KL,1 or K ≤ KL,1, I distinguish between these two cases.
”Case 1” means that K > KL,1 while ”case 2” means that K ≤ KL,1.
¤ Case 1: K > KL,1. Delaying investment is not profitable.
The infringer invests today if and only if ULI,1(i) ≥ 0 or
K ≤ 2απ(1− δ)− c , KL,1. (23)
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¤Case 2:K ≤ KL,1. Delaying investment yields a non-negative
payoﬀ. The infringer invests today if and only if ULI,1(i) ≥ ULI,1(n) or
K ≤ απ(1− δ) + αc− c
1− α , KL,1. (24)
Lemma 10 Under scenario 1, in the laches regime, the infringer invests in
period 1 if K ≤ KL,1. If K > KL,1 he does not invest.
¥ Scenario 2. δ ∈ [δL, δL].
In Appendix A.2, I detail the analysis corresponding to this scenario. The
methodology is identical to that used for scenario 1 above, but the payoﬀs,
and thus the ”boundaries” functions KL,2, KL,2 and KL,2, are diﬀerent:



KL,2 , π
KL,2 , 2απ(1− δ)− c
KL,2 , απ(1−2δ)−c1−α .
(25)
As shown in Appendix A.2, it is necessary to define two values. First, the
function
•
•
δ = 2απ−c−π
2απ such that
•
•
δ ∈ [δL, δL]. Then the kinked curve
•
•
K = KL,1
if δ ∈ [δL,
•
•
δ] and
•
•
K = KL,2 if δ ∈ [
•
•
δ, δL]. I show in Appendix A.2 that:
Lemma 11 Under scenario 2, in the laches regime, there are three possibil-
ities depending on the probability α that the innovation is profitable:
• If α ∈ £1
2
, eα¤ , the infringer invests in period 1 if K ≤ KL,2, delays
investment for K ∈ [KL,2, KL,2] and does not invest if K ≥ KL,2.
• If α ∈
heα, eeαi, the infringer invests in period 1 if K ≤ ••K. If K ∈
[
•
•
K,KL,2], the infringer delays investment. If K >
•
•
K and K > KL,2,
the infringer does not invest.
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• If α ∈
heeα, 1i , the infringer invests in period 1 if K ≤ KL,1. He does
not invest if K > KL,1.
¥ Scenario 3. δ ∈ [0, δL].
For these values of the compensatory rule δ, the patentholder does not
litigate. Hence, the analysis is formally equivalent to the no laches case. The
three boundaries on K are given in (18). Lemma 7 applies here.
Now, I can combine the results concerning the timing of investment (lem-
mas 7,8 and 9) with those concerning litigation (lemmas 3 and 4). I obtain
the diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes as summarized in proposition 3. As for
the ”no laches” regime, I do not detail the exact parameters’ values for which
a particular outcome occurs: the exposition would be tedious. This is done
in Appendix A.2.
Proposition 12 (Equilibrium outcomes under the doctrine of laches).
When the probability of commercial success is high (α ≥ 1
2
), there are four
equilibrium outcomes depending on the parameters of the model:
• The infringer invests in period 1 and the patentholder does not litigate
(EN).
• The infringer invests in period 1 and the patentholder litigates in period
1 (EE).
• The infringer invests in period 2 and the patentholder does not litigate
(DN).
• The infringer does not invest (NO).
The logic behind the names of the outcomes is similar to that in the ”no
laches” regime. I present figures L1 to L3 to illustrate the diﬀerent equi-
librium outcomes of the game in a livelier manner. There are three figures
because, when the compensatory rule δ belongs to [δL, δL], the timing of
investment depends on α: three intervals must be considered separately on
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α ∈ [1
2
, 1]. At first sight, these figures are quite similar to the ones repre-
senting the equilibrium regions in the ”no laches” regime. In fact, the main
diﬀerences come from the respective position of the boundaries between the
regions. This will be analyzed in section 5.
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Now that I have derived the equilibrium outcomes in both regimes, I turn
to analyzing the economic insights of the model. In section 4, I investigate
the eﬀects of the compensatory rule δ, in both the ”no laches” and the laches
regimes. In section 5, I analyze the eﬀect of the doctrine of laches, compared
to the situation where it does not apply.
4 Eﬀect of the compensatory rule on invest-
ment and players’ welfare
Lemmas 2, 3 and 4 constituted a first step into analyzing the eﬀect of the
compensatory rule δ on litigation. Now, I analyze how this rule aﬀects the
timing of investment and players’ welfare. The main results are captured by
propositions 4 and corollary 1 below.
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Proposition 13 In either regime, an increase in the compensatory rule δ
can
• delay investment or
• speed-up investment.
The first result in this proposition is intuitive. An increase in the
compensatory rule δ reduces the infringer’s gross payoﬀ (since it increases
the patentholder’s gross payoﬀ). As a result, for any c (cost of litigation),
α (probability of success) and K (sunk cost) given, this payoﬀ reduction
encourages the infringer to delay investment: this is consistent with the ba-
sic insight from a real option setting. Consider that in each period the
infringer gets a gross payoﬀ Π(δ) which decreases with δ. If he invests in
period 1, he gets −K + α

 Π(δ)|{z}
period 1
+ Π(δ)|{z}
period 2

. If he delays investment, he
gets α

−K + Π(δ)|{z}
period 2

. Delaying is preferrable if and only if K ≥ α
1−αΠ(δ).
The threshold value is decreasing in δ meaning that delaying becomes the
preferred option for a wider range of K values.
The second result in proposition 4 is less intuitive. The reason is
that, in a real option setting, one expects a decrease in the investor’s payoﬀ
to delay investment, as explained above. But in the present setting, one
needs to consider the eﬀect of an increase in the compensatory rule δ on
the patentholder ’s behavior. The basic reason behind the second insight of
proposition 4 is the possibility of an equilibrium switch due to an increase
in δ. To see this, consider the increase from δ2 to δ3 in Figure 3 below.
This figure concerns the ”no laches” regime but the same rationale applies
to the laches regime. When δ = δ2 the infringer delays and the patentholder
does not litigate. Suppose now that δ = δ3 and δ3 > δ2. If the infringer
were to delay (i.e stick to the same strategy), he would now face litigation.
This is because the increase in the compensatory rule from δ2 to δ3 provides
incentives for the patentholder to litigate. As a result, the infringer’s gross
payoﬀ from delaying is lower when δ = δ3 than when δ = δ2 (since he faces
litigation for δ = δ3 but not for δ = δ2) . Ceteris paribus, this implies that
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investing early (in period 1), becomes more attractive. So, an increase in the
compensatory rule can indeed speed-up investment.
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early
investment, 
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EN
delayed
investment, 
no litigation.
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early
investment, 
delayed
litigation.
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No 
investment.
NO
Figure 3: Eﬀect of an increase of the compensatory rule δ in the ”no
laches” regime.
Corollary 14 An increase in the compensatory rule δ can make the paten-
tholder worse-oﬀ in both regimes.
To see this, consider Figure 3 above. Again, it concerns the ”no laches”
regime but the same rationale applies in the laches regime. Focus now on
an increase from δ1 to δ2. This induces a switch from an equilibrium with
early investment and delayed litigation (ED) to an equilibrium with delayed
investment and no litigation (DN ). Clearly the patentholder is worse-oﬀ as
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she does not litigate anymore under DN and so she is not compensated. To
understand this insight, one needs to remember the first eﬀect derived in
proposition 4: an increase in the compensatory rule δ incites the infringer
to delay investment. It implies that for a given cost of litigation c, litigation
becomes less attractive for the patentholder: when investment is delayed
(δ = δ2), she obtains compensation only from the second-period profit (δ2π)
whereas when investment is not delayed (δ = δ1) she obtains compensation
from both period 1- and period 2- profits (δ1π + δ1π). For low enough values
of δ2 the increase in δ does not compensate the decrease in the ”pie” that
the two players must share (this ”pie” decreases from π + π to π). And so
the patentholder is worse-oﬀ.14
Summarizing, there are two main results. First, a decrease in the in-
fringer’s gross payoﬀ (through an increase in the patentholder’s compensa-
tion) can speed-up investment. This diﬀers from the standard implication of
the real option set-up. Second, an increase in the patentholder’s compensa-
tion can make her worse-oﬀ.15 I now turn to the analysis of the doctrine of
laches.
5 Regime comparison
In section 4, I focused on the eﬀect of the compensatory rule, in either regime.
In this section, I compare the laches and the ”no laches” regimes, for any
14In a companion paper on the doctrine of estoppel, I show that a higher probability of
a valid patent can hurt the patentholder. However, the argument in the present paper is
totally diﬀerent: the patentholder’s payoﬀ is reduced when δ increases due to a change in
the timing of investment by the infringer.
15Two of Choi (1998)’s results echo these findings. However the underlying economic
explanations are totally diﬀerent. He shows that an increase in patent validity can ”ac-
celerate” entry. This is because for some parameters values, there is no ”room” for two
infringers: being the second entrant is unprofitable and there is a race to be the first one.
Choi also shows that an increase in patent validity can reduce the patentholder’s payoﬀ.
This is because the first entry is accomodated and occurs immediately due to the ”pre-
emption” race: the patentholder’s profit is reduced because entry is ”accelerated”. In my
model, an increase in the compensation rule reduces the patentholder’s profit, not because
it generates earlier infringement, but because it delays infringement (see the interpretation
of corollary 1). Hence, the explanation is the opposite of Choi’s.
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given level of the compensatory rule. The question is: what are the qualitative
eﬀects induced by the doctrine of laches, compared to a regime where it does
not apply? Proposition 1 (where I focus on litigation) constituted a first
step into this comparative analysis. Now, the idea is to investigate how the
implementation of a laches defense aﬀects:
• the timing of investment into the infringing activity,
• the equilibrium outcomes of the infringement-litigation game and
• players’ welfare,
for any given level of the parameters of the model.
Comparing the regimes implies to consider separately five diﬀerent cases,
depending on the magnitude of α. To see that, consider figures N1 toN3 and
figures L1 to L3: the timing of investment changes depending on cutoﬀ values
for α, which are not the same in the laches and in the ”no laches” regimes.
As a result, five intervals must be considered: α ∈
£
1
2
, bα¤ , α ∈ hbα, bbαi ,
α ∈
hbbα, eαi , α ∈ heα, eeαi and α ∈ heeα, 1i . Appendix B.1 shows that the cutoﬀ
values are indeed ranked in this way. To be as accurate as possible, the
comparative analysis is conducted for each interval. Yet, it turns out that no
additional insight is obtained by considering intervals others than α ∈
£
1
2
, bα¤ .
Hence, in what follows, I concentrate on the interval α ∈
£
1
2
, bα¤ which
exhibits all the possible eﬀects induced by introducing a defense
of laches. The four other cases are treated in Appendix B.2. In section
5.1 I analyze the eﬀect of the doctrine on the occurence and the timing of
investment in the follow-on innovation. In section 5.2, I investigate the eﬀect
of the doctrine of players’ welfare.
5.1 Investment and equilibrium outcomes
Figure 4 below illustrates the eﬀect of the doctrine of laches on the equilib-
rium outcomes. The figure is obtained by superposing Figure N1 and Figure
L1. A dotted line represents a boundary under the doctrine of laches while a
solid line represents the same boundary in the no laches regime. As shown in
the figure, the doctrine of laches induces a change of the equilibrium outcome
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for six parameters configurations denoted I, I 0, J , M , O and P . It does so
essentially, but not only, by modifying some boundaries between the equi-
librium regions. This is why it is important to compare analytically these
boundaries. It can be seen that the doctrine of laches aﬀects the boundaries
KN,1 and KN,2, but leaves both KN,3 and KN,2 unchanged. The following
lemma summarizes how KN,1 and KN,2 are modified.
Lemma 15 i) KN,1(D) ≥ KL,1(D) and ii) KN,2(D) ≥ KL,2(D).
Proof. For i), we have KN,1(D) = 2απ(1 − D) − αc ≥ KL,1(D) =
2απ(1−D)−c since α ≤ 1 and by the same token, KN,2(D) = απ(1−2D)−αc1−α ≥
KL,2(D) =
απ(1−2D)−c
1−α .
In Figure 4, it is clear that KN,1 is above KL,1 and KN,2 is above KL,2.
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I now discuss specifically the eﬀect attached to each of these six con-
figurations. The main insight from the following analysis (summarized by
proposition 5), is that the doctrine of laches can have opposite eﬀects on the
occurence and the timing of investment, depending on the parameters of the
model.
• Configuration I : Tthe doctrine of laches induce may a switch from
an equilibrium where investment occurs in period 1 and litigation is
delayed (ED), to an equilibrium where investment does not occur at
all (NO).
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For these values of the compensatory rule (δ ≥ δL), the infringer does
not benefit from delaying investment: the patentholder’s compensation is
too high for the infringer to sacrifice period-1 profit. Hence, the infringer’s
trade-oﬀ is between investing in period 1 and not investing at all. The doc-
trine of laches has a time-inconsistency eﬀect: by lemma 1, we know that
if the doctrine of laches is available, the infringer will always invoke it as
a defense argument when the patentholder litigates. Anticipating that, as
shown in proposition 1, the patentholder may litigate earlier, that is: before
uncertainty is fully resolved. As a result, the infringer would face litigation
costs with probability 1 if he were to invest in period 1. On the contrary,
in the absence of the doctrine, the infringer would face litigation only with
probability α, as the patentholder would delay litigation until uncertainty is
resolved and litigate only when demand is high (which occurs with probabil-
ity α). The prospect of being involved in patent litigation at an early stage
can discourage the infringer to invest, although he would have invested in the
absence of the doctrine. This eﬀect is illustrated in Figure 4 : for δ ≥ δL, the
boundaryKN,1 that separates investment and no investment in a ”no laches”
regime switches to KL,1 under the doctrine of laches. Because KL,1 ≤ KN,1,
it follows that for all K ∈ [KL,1,KN,1], investment does not occur anymore.
The first eﬀect of the doctrine of laches is identified: it may deter investment
in the follow-on innovation.
• Configuration I 0 : The doctrine of laches may induce a switch from
an equilibrium where investment occurs in period 1 and litigation is
delayed (ED) to an equilibrium where both occur in period 1 (EE ).
Section 3 analyzed and explained the intuition for this change in litigation
behavior: the doctrine of laches encourages the patentholder not to delay
precisely because delay is punished by a reduction of the damages collected.
Notice that for the values of K such as in configuration I 0, the infringer still
invests (in period 1), despite early litigation.
• Configuration J : The doctrine may induce a switch from an equi-
librium where investment occurs in period 1 and litigation is delayed
(ED) to an equilibrium where investment is delayed and litigation does
not occur (DN ).
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Notice first that for δ ∈
h
δL, δL
i
, delaying investment can be profitable.
If the doctrine of laches applies and the infringer invests in period 1, he faces
litigation in period 1 (see Figure 2). If the doctrine of laches does not apply
and the infringer invests in period 1, he faces litigation in period 2 only if
the investment turns out to be profitable, i.e with probability α (see Figure
2 as well). Hence, the ”real” cost of investing in period 1 is higher under
the doctrine of laches (K + c) than in the ”no laches” regime (K + αc).
Consequently, everything else equal, this higher cost implies that delaying
investment becomes more attractive, for some values of K. Configuration J
illustrates this eﬀect. This is the second eﬀect of the doctrine: it may delay
investment.
• ConfigurationM : The doctrine induces a switch from an equilibrium
where investment occurs in period 1 and litigation is delayed (ED) to
an equilibrium where investment occurs in period 1 and litigation is
deterred (EN ).
Here, the doctrine of laches does not aﬀect the timing of investment. But,
as stated in lemma 3, it deters litigation. More precisely, for all δ ∈
h
δN , δL
i
,
(delayed) litigation occurs in a ”no laches” regime but does not occur in a
laches regime. I provided an explanation for this eﬀect in section 3.
• Configuration O : The doctrine may induce a switch from an equilib-
rium where investment is delayed and litigation is deterred (DN ) to an
equilibrium where investment occurs in period 1 and litigation is still
deterred (EN ).
As for configuration M, the doctrine of laches deters litigation for these
parameters values, if the infringer invests in period 1. But if he invests
in period 1 in the absence of the doctrine, he faces litigation in period 2.
The prospect of not being litigated under the doctrine of laches increases
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the expected reward from investment, for all values of α and K (due to the
absence of litigation costs and damages). This incites the infringer to invest
in period 1 instead of delaying. In the absence of the doctrine, if he were
to invest in period 1, he would face litigation in period 2 while if he were to
delay, he would not face litigation. This latter eﬀect dominates in the absence
of the doctrine, and the infringer has an incentive to delay investment. This
is the third eﬀect of the doctrine: it may ”speed-up” investment.
• Configuration P : The doctrine may induce a switch from an equi-
librium where investment is deterred (NO) to an equilibrium where it
occurs in period 1 and litigation is deterred (EN ).
As for configurations M and O, the doctrine of laches deters litigation.
Here, and for the same reasons advanced to explain the qualitative changes
for configurationO, the prospect of not being litigated encourage the infringer
to invest (and to invest early). On the contrary, in the ”no laches” regime,
anticipating litigation, the infringer was deterred from investing for these high
values of K. This is the fourth eﬀect of the doctrine: it spurs investment.
Proposition 3 summarizes the analysis conducted for each parameters
configuration.
Proposition 16 (the doctrine of laches and the investment into the
infringing activity). The doctrine of laches has four possible eﬀects:
• it can deter investment (configuration I),
• it can delay investment (configuration J),
• it can speed-up investment (configuration O),
• it can spur investment (configuration P).
Having analyzed how the doctrine of laches aﬀects the incentives to invest
in the follow-on innovation, I turn to investigating how it aﬀects players’
payoﬀs.
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5.2 Players’ welfare
I can now investigate more precisely how the doctrine of laches aﬀects players’
welfare. There are two results. First, the doctrine of laches can make both
players worse oﬀ (proposition 6). This is a straightfoward implication of the
eﬀect isolated in proposition 3 for configuration I: the fact that the doctrine
deters investment. Second, the doctrine can leave the players indiﬀerent or
make the patentholder worse oﬀ and the infringer better oﬀ (proposition 7).
Proposition 17 When the probability of success is high (α ≥ 1
2
) and patent
protection is strong (δ ≥ δL) or intermediate (δ ∈
h
δL, δL
i
), a regime where
the doctrine of laches applies can make both the patentholder and the infringer
worse oﬀ compared to a regime where it does not apply.
Proof.
• Consider first strong patent protection (δ ≥ δL). From proposition
5, we know that for configuration I investment is deterred in a laches
regime, while it would occur in a ”no laches” regime, implying that
both players are worse-oﬀ with the doctrine of laches. Consider then
configuration I 0.We can compute players’ payoﬀs in both regimes. First
in the ”no laches” regime N (litigation is delayed):½
UNH = −αc+ 2απ(1− δ)
UNI = −K − αc+ 2απ(1− δ).
Then, in the laches regime L (litigation is not delayed):½
ULH = −c+ 2απ(1− δ)
ULI = −K − c+ 2απ(1− δ).
It follows that UNH ≥ ULH and UNI ≥ ULI .
• Consider then intermediate patent protection (δ ∈
h
δL, δL
i
) . Here the
two relevant configurations are J and I 0. I compute players’ payoﬀs
under either regime, for each configuration. Consider configuration J.
In the ”no laches” regime N :½
UNH = −αc+ 2απ(1− δ)
UNI = −K − αc+ 2απ(1− δ)
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and in the laches regime L :½
UNH = 0
ULI = α(π −K).
Clearly, the patentholder is worse-oﬀ in regime L. The infringer is worse-
oﬀ if and only if:
K ≤ απ(1− 2δ)− αc
1− α = KN,2,
which holds for configuration J. Then, consider configuration I 0. It has
been proved above that for this configuration, players are better-oﬀ in a no
laches regime.
This proposition states a counterintuitive result: the defense available to
the defendant (infringer) can make him worse-oﬀ. To understand this point,
consider simply the explanation for the equilibrium switch characterizing
configuration I : the doctrine of laches deters investment compared to a
regime where it does not apply and so leaves both the patentholder and the
infringer worse-oﬀ.
Proposition 18 When the probability of success is high (α ≥ 1
2
) and patent
protection is low (δ ≤ δL), a regime where the doctrine of laches applies
can leave the patentholder indiﬀerent or make her worse-oﬀ, compared to a
regime where it does not apply. Also, it can leave the infringer indiﬀerent or
make him better-oﬀ.
Proof. For all δ ≤ δN , litigation does not occur under either regime
so that a regime change leaves the players indiﬀerent. For δ ∈
h
δN , δL
i
,
consider three configurations: M,O and P. For configuration M ; introducing
a laches defense deters litigation and so makes the patentholder worse-oﬀ and
the infringer better-oﬀ (he still invests in period 1 but does not pay damages).
For configuration O, the patentholder would not litigate in either regime. So
introducing a laches defense leaves her indiﬀerent. But the infringer would
invest earlier so that his expected payoﬀ is −K+2απ in a laches regime, and
α(π−K) in the ”no laches” regime. He is better-oﬀ in a laches regime since
−K + 2απ ≥ α(π − K) if and only if K ≤ α
1−απ = KL,3, which holds for
configuration O. Finally, for configuration P, the patentholder is not aﬀected
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by the introduction of a laches defense (in the laches regime, she does not
litigate and in the ”no laches” regime, there is no investment in the first
place). But the infringer is clearly better-oﬀ as the defense of laches makes
investment profitable.
The results in proposition 7 are more conform to the explicit objective of
the doctrine of laches than the result derived in proposition 6: As a ”defense”
argument, the doctrine is supposed to benefit the infringer (the ”defendant”
in the trial) and sanction the patentholder (if she adopts the prohibited
behavior). Here, in the particular economic context inquired, I show that
indeed the doctrine improves the situation of the infringer and possibly pe-
nalizes the patentholder, but only for specific values of the parameters. The
most interesting result is that the doctrine can hurt both players, as stated
in proposition 6.
I now briefly discuss my results of this section. The main insight of the
analysis is that the doctrine of laches has contrasted and possibly opposite
eﬀects on the incentive to invest in the infringing activity. It can spur or deter
investment and it can delay investment or speed it up (proposition 5). The
occurence of one or the other of these outcomes depends very much on the
parameters of the model. In particular, the model suggests that when patent
protection is strong (because the patentholder’s compensation δ is high), then
it might be better not to implement the doctrine of laches: indeed proposition
6 states that the doctrine hurts both the patentholder and the infringer since
the infringer is deterred from investing. But it also hurts society which does
not benefit from the follow-on innovation. Of course, this analysis is only a
first investigation into the quantitative and qualitative eﬀects of the doctrine
of laches, within a stylized framework. I believe it is much too early to
derive policy recommendations. However, the model shows that the doctrine
is likely to have non-trivial eﬀects on both the occurence of investments into
follow-on innovations and on the ”pace” of these investments.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyzed the eﬀects of the doctrine of laches and compen-
satory damages on the incentives to infringe a patent and to enforce this
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patent. ”Infringement” is equivalent to an investment in a follow-on inno-
vation which requires the patented technology. Both the infringer and the
patentholder have a ”real option” problem. The profitabibility of the in-
fringing product is initially uncertain. The infringer is the leader and can
invest before or after uncertainty is resolved. The patentholder is the follower
and, if the infringer invested before uncertainty was resolved, she herself can
litigate before or after profitability becomes known. Litigation is costly for
both players. Delayed litigation can be punished by the doctrine of laches
which prevents the patentholder from getting damages for infringement that
occured during the delay period.
I show that the doctrine of laches can deter litigation or prompt earlier
litigation (proposition 1). I also show that the doctrine has diﬀerent ef-
fects on the timing of investment in the follow-on innovation depending on
parameters values: it can deter or spur investment. It can speed-up or de-
lay investment (proposition 5). It also aﬀects players’ welfare: although it
is a defense argument, it can make the defendant (the infringer) worse-oﬀ
(proposition 6). I show that an increase of the patentholder’s compensa-
tion can delay or speed-up investment (proposition 4). It can make the
patentholder worse-oﬀ (corollary 1).
The analysis of the model proposed is sometimes cumbersome. Yet, it
is also useful because it yields counterintuitive conclusions. For example,
increasing the level of damages does not necessarily benefit the patentholder.
Regarding the doctrine of laches, I show that it not only aﬀects the timing of
litigation, but also and perhaps most importantly, it aﬀects the occurence and
the timing of investment in the follow-on innovation. This suggests that this
doctrine should be taken into consideration from a patent policy perspective.
Appendix
Appendix A: Investment timing when α ≥ 1
2
.
In the main text, many analytical steps have been omitted in order to
simplify the progression towards the economic results gathered in sections 4
and 5. In Appendix A, I report these omited steps.
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Appendix A.1: The infringer’s decision in the ”no laches
regime”.
In Appendix A.1, I report the omitted analytical steps for scenarios 1, 2
and 3.
¥ Scenario 1: δ ∈ [δL, 1].
The analysis of this scenario is conducted in detail in section 3.3. Here,
I analyze the respective positions of the three boundaries KN,1(δ), KN,1(δ)
and KN,1(δ) defined by (12), (15) and (16).
It can be shown that KN,1(δ) ≥ KN,1(δ). Indeed, this inequality holds if
and only if (2α − 1)π(1 − δ) + (1 − α)c ≥ 0 which holds for all α ≥ 1
2
and
δ ∈ [δL, 1]. Also, it can be shown that KN,1(δ) ≥ KN,1(δ). This inequality
holds if and only if 2α−1
1−α π(1 − δ) + c ≥ 0 which holds for all α ≥
1
2
and
δ ∈ [δL, 1]. Hence: (
KN,1(δ) ≥ KN,1(δ)
KN,1(δ) ≥ KN,1(δ)
(26)
It follows that for all K ≥ KN,1(δ) the infringer invests in period 1 if
K ≤ KN,1(δ) but does not invest otherwise. And for all K ≤ KN,1(δ) he
invests in period 1. So, for all K ≤ KN,1(δ), the infringer invests in period
1. This is stated in lemma 5.
Analysis of KN,1(δ) = 2απ(1 − δ) − αc. This function is obviously
downward sloping with KN,1(0) = 2απ − αc and KN,1(δ) = 0 ⇐⇒ δ =
1 − c
2π =
bδ > cπ = δL since π ≥ 3c. In addition, KN,1( cπ ) = 2απ − 3αc and
KN,1(
c
2π ) = 2απ − 2αc.
¥ Scenario 2: δ ∈ [δN , δL].
Suppose the infringer delayed investment. His payoﬀ if he invests is
UNI,2(i) = π −K. Indeed, the patentholder does not litigate. Hence:
UNI,2(i) = π −K
½
< 0 if K > KN,2 , π
≥ 0 if K ≤ KN,2 , π.
(27)
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In period 1, the infringer’s expected payoﬀ if he does not invest is:
UNI,1(n) =
½
0 if K > KN,2 , π
α(π −K) if K ≤ KN,2 , π.
(28)
By contrast, his payoﬀ if he invests in period 1 is:
UNI,1(i) = −K + 2πα(1− δ)− αc, (29)
since the patentholder will litigate in period 2 and obtain a share of both
period 1 and period 2 profits (the doctrine of laches does not apply).
Again, I can distinguish between two cases.
♦ If K > KN,2, delaying investment is never profitable. Is it
profitable to invest today? The condition for profitability is UNI,1(i) ≥ 0
which is equivalent to:
K ≤ 2απ(1− δ)− αc , KN,2. (30)
♦ IfK ≤ KN,2, delaying investment yields a non-negative profit.
The infringer invests today if and only if UNI,1(i) ≥ UNI,1(n) or:
K ≤ α
1− α [π(1− 2δ)− c] , KN,2. (31)
As for scenario 1, it remains to analyze in the (K, δ) space the respective
position ofKN,2, KN,2 andKN,2 defined by (27), (30) and (31). The diﬃculty
in that case is that these positions depend on the value of α. As a result, I
must distinguish again distinguish between cases depending on the value of
α on the interval α ∈ [1
2
, 1] (remember that I assumed α ≥ 1
2
).
Notice first that KN,2(δ) = KN,1(δ). Hence, from the above analysis I
know that KN,2(δ) is downward sloping with KN,2(δ) = 0 at δ = bδ. I can
compute KN,2(δN) = 2α(π − c). Then, KN,2(δ) = π is a constant. Finally,
KN,2(δ) is linear and decreasing in δ and KN,2(δN) = απ−2αc1−α . Notice that the
line representingKN,2(δ) is steeper than that ofKN,2(δN). Indeed, 2απ1−α ≥ 2απ
always holds. Finally, KN,2(
c
π ) =
α
1−α(π − 3c) ≥ 0 since π ≥ 3c.
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In order to analyze the respective positions of KN,2(δ), KN,2(δ) and
KN,2(δ), I define the following values: bα = π2(π−c) and bbα = π2π−3c . First,
notice that bα ≥ 1
2
if and only if c ≥ 0 which holds. Also, notice that bbα ≥ bα
if and only if 2π(π − c) ≥ π(2π − 3c) which holds. In addition, bbα ≤ 1 if and
only if π ≥ 3c which holds by assumption.
♦Consider first the interval α ∈ [1
2
, bα].
For these values of α, we have KN,2(δN) ≤ KN,2(δN) if and only if α ≤
π
2(π−c) = bα which holds by assumption. And since KN,2(.) is constant while
KN,2(.) is downward sloping, it follows that KN,2(δ) ≥ KN,2(δ).
Also, I have KN,2(δN) ≤ KN,2(δN) if and only if α ≤ bα which holds
by assumption. Since KN,2(δN) is steeper than KN,2(δN) it follows that
KN,2(δ) ≥ KN,2(δ). Hence,
KN,2(δ) ≥ KN,2(δ) ≥ KN,2(δ). (32)
Hence, for all K > KN,2(δ) the infringer does not invest. For K ≤
KN,2(δ) he invests in period 1 if K ≤ KN,2(δ) and he delays investment if
K > KN,2(δ). This is stated in lemma 6.
♦Consider then the interval α ∈ (bα, bbα].
I know from the preceding analysis thatKN,2(δ) < KN,2(δ) andKN,2(δ) <
KN,2(δ). I investigate the condition for the lines representing KN,2(δ) and
KN,2(δ) to intersect KN,2(δ) = π at a point δ ∈ [δN , δL]. To that end, I solve
KN,2(δ) = π for δ. This yields δ = 2απ−π−αc2απ =
•
δ. Then I solve KN,2(δ) = π
for δ. This yields δ =
•
δ as well. The conditions for
•
δ ∈ [δN , δL] are
•
δ ≥ δN
and
•
δ ≤ δL. The first condition amounts at showing that α ≥ π2(π−c) = bα,
which holds. The second condition implies that α ≤ π
2π−3c =
bbα, which holds.
These two conditions are clearly satisfied on the interval (bα, bbα].
Hence we have:(
KN,2(δ) ≥ KN,2(δ) ≥ KN,2(δ) if δ ∈ [δN ,
•
δ]
KN,2(δ) ≤ KN,2(δ) ≤ KN,2(δ) if δ ∈ [
•
δ, δL]
(33)
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Define the kinked curved
•
K(δ) as:
•
K(δ) =
(
KN,2(δ) if δ ∈ [δN ,
•
δ]
KN,2(δ) if δ ∈ [
•
δ, δL]
(34)
It follows that for all K <
•
K(δ) the infringer invests in period 1. For
K ≥
•
K(δ) but K ≤ KN,2(δ), he delays investment until period 2. Finally,
for all K ≥
•
K(δ) and K > KN,2(δ), he does not invest. This is stated in
lemma 6.
♦ Finally, consider α ∈ [bbα, 1].
From the preceding analysis, we know that
•
δ ≥ δL for every α in this
interval. Hence, for all δ ∈ [δN , δL]:
KN,2(δ) ≥ KN,2(δ) ≥ KN,2(δ). (35)
Consequently, for allK ≥ KN,2(δ) andK ≤ KN,2(δ), the infringer invests
in period 1. For allK > KN,2(δ) he does not invest. And for allK ≤ KN,2(δ),
he invests in period 1. It follows that for all K ≤ KN,2(δ) = KN,1(δ) the
infringer invests in period 1 and does not invest for larger values of K. This
is stated in lemma 6.
¥ Scenario 3: δ ∈ [0, δN ].
Suppose the infringer delayed investment. In period 2, his net payoﬀ from
investing is UNI,2(i) = π −K since the patentholder does not litigate. Hence:
UNI,2(i) = π −K
½
< 0 if K > KN,3 , π
≥ 0 if K ≤ KN,3 , π.
(36)
In period 1, the infringer’s expected payoﬀ if he does not invest is:
UFI,1(n) =
½
0 if K > KN,3
α(π −K) if K ≤ KN,3.
(37)
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If the infringer invests in period 1, he obtains:
UNI,1(i) = −K + α2π, (38)
as the patentholder will never litigate.
♦ If K ≥ KN,3, delaying investment is never profitable. Invest-
ing today is profitable if and only if UNI,1(i) ≥ 0 or:
K ≤ 2απ , KN,3. (39)
♦ If K < KN,3, delaying yields a non-negative profit. The
infringer invests today if and only if UNI,1(i) ≥ UNI,1(n) or:
K ≤ α
1− απ , KN,3. (40)
Again, I have to analyze in the (K, δ) space the respective position of
KN,3(δ), KN,3(δ) and KN,3(δ), respectively defined by (36), (39) and (40).
Obviously, 2απ ≥ π if and only if α ≥ 1
2
which holds, so that KN,3(δ) ≥
KN,3(δ). And α1−απ ≥ π if and only if α ≥
1
2
which holds as well, so that
KN,3(δ) ≥ KN,3(δ). Hence,(
KN,3(δ) ≥ KN,3(δ)
KN,3(δ) ≥ KN,3(δ).
(41)
It follows that for all K ≥ KN,3(δ) the infringer invests in period 1
provided that K ≤ KN,3(δ), otherwise he does not invest. And for all
K ≤ KN,3(δ) the infringer invests in period 1. So, for all K ≤ KN,3(δ)
the infringer invests in period 1. This is stated in lemma 7
Analysis of KN,3(δ) = 2απ. Notice only that KN,3(δ) = 2απ is a con-
stant.
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The following lemma combines the above analysis with the analysis of
litigation conducted in section 3. It gives the exact values of the parameters
for which a specific equilibrium outcome occurs. Figures N1, N2 and N3
capture these features in a livelier manner.
Lemma 19 (Equilibrium outcomes when the doctrine of laches
does not apply). When the probability of commercial success is high (α ≥
1
2
),
• If patent protection is strong (δ ∈ [δL, 1]), the infringer invests in pe-
riod 1 if the sunk cost is low enough (K ≤ KN,1) and does not invest
otherwise. If he invests, the patentholder delays litigation.
• If patent protection is weak (δ ∈ [0, δN)), the infringer invests in pe-
riod 1 if the sunk cost is low enough (K ≤ KN,3) and does not invest
otherwise. If he invests, the patentholder does not litigate.
• If patent protection is intermediate (δ ∈ [δN , δL]), the timing of invest-
ment depends on the probability of commercial success:
— When success is moderately likely (α ∈
£
1
2
, bα¤), the infringer in-
vests in period 1 if K ≤ KN,2 and the patentholder delays lit-
igation. The infringer delays investment until period 2 if K ∈
[KN,2, KN,2] and the patentholder does not litigate. And the in-
fringer does not invest if K ≥ KN,2.
— When success is likely (α ∈ (bα, bbα]), the infringer invests in period
1 if K ≤
•
K and the patentholder delays litigation. The infringer
delays investment if K ∈ [
•
K,KN,2] and the patentholder does not
litigate. And the infringer does not invest if K ≥
•
K and K ≥
KN,2.
— When success is very likely (α ∈ (bbα, 1]), the infringer invests in
period 1 if K ≤ KN,1 and the patentholder delays litigation. Oth-
erwise, the infringer does not invests.
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Appendix A.2. The infringer’s decision in the ”laches regime”
The methodology here is similar to that in Appendix A.1.
¥ Scenario 1: δ ∈ [δL, 0].
I want to analyze the respective of the three functions KL,1(δ), KL,1(δ)
and KL,1(δ), respectively defined by (20), (23) and (24). I can show that
KL,1(δ) ≥ KL,1(δ). Indeed, this inequality holds if and only if π(1− δ)(2α−
1) ≥ 0 which holds for all α ≥ 1
2
and δ ∈ [δL, 1]. Also, we can show that
KL,1(δ) ≥ KL,1(δ). This inequality holds if and only if απ(1−δ)+αc−c1−α ≥
π(1− δ)− c which holds for all α ≥ 1
2
. Hence:(
KL,1(δ) ≥ KL,1(δ)
KL,1(δ) ≥ KL,1(δ)
(42)
From that, we can conclude that if K ≥ KL,1(δ), the infringer invests in
period 1 if and only if K ≤ KL,1(δ) and if K ≤ KL,1(δ), the infringer always
invest in period 1. So, for all K ≤ KL,1(δ), the infringer invests in period 1.
Otherwise he does not invest. This is stated in lemma 8.
Analysis of KL,1(δ). The function KL,1(δ) = 2απ(1− δ)− c is linear and
decreasing in δ. In addition, KL,1(δL) = 2απ − c(2α + 1) and KL,1(δ) = 0
for δ = 1− c
2απ =
bbδ.
¥ Scenario 2: δ ∈ [δL, δL].
If the infringer did not invest in period 1, his net payoﬀ from investing in
period 2 is ULI,2(i) = −K + π. Indeed, he faces no litigation in period 2. It
follows that:
ULI,2(i) = −K + π
½
< 0 if K > KL,2 , π
≥ 0 if K ≤ KL,2 , π.
(43)
In period 1, the infringer’s payoﬀ if he does not invest is:
ULI,1(n) =
½
0 if K > KL,2 , π
α(π −K) if K ≤ KL,2 , π.
(44)
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His payoﬀ if he invests in period 1 is:
ULI,1(i) = −K − c+ 2απ(1− δ), (45)
since the patentholder litigates in period 1 (before uncertainty is resolved).
♦Suppose K ≥ KN,2. Then ULI,1(i) ≥ 0 if and only if:
K ≤ 2απ(1− δ)− c , KL,2. (46)
♦Suppose K < KN,2. Then ULI,1(i) ≥ ULI,1(n) if and only if:
K ≤ απ(1− 2δ)− c
1− α , KL,2. (47)
¤ On this interval, I analyze the functions KL,2(δ), KL,2(δ) and KL,2(δ)
respectively defined by (43), (46) and (47). Notice first that KL,2(δ) =
KL,1(δ). Hence, from the above analysis, I know that KL,2(δ) is downward
sloping with KL,2(δ) = 0 at δ = bbδ. I can compute KL,2(δL) = 2απ − 2c.
Then, KL,2(δ) = π is a constant. Finally, KL,2(δ) is linear and decreasing in
δ and KL,2(δL) = απ−2c1−α . Notice that the line representing KL,2(δ) is steeper
than that of KL,2(δ). Indeed, 2απ1−α ≥ 2απ always holds.
¤ In order to analyze the respective positions of KL,2(δ), KL,2(δ)
and KL,2(δ), I define the following values: eα = π+2c2π and eeα = π+c2(π−c) . Notice
first that eα ≥ 1
2
if and only if 2c ≥ 0 which holds. Also, notice that eeα ≥ eα if
and only if (π+2c)(π− c) ≤ (π+ c)π or −2c2 ≤ 0 which holds. In addition,eeα ≤ 1 if and only if π − 3c ≥ 0 which holds by assumption.
♦ Consider first the interval α ∈
£
1
2
, eα¤ .
For these values of α, KL,2(δ) ≤ KL,2(δ) = π . To establish this result,
it is suﬃcient to show that KL,2(δL) ≤ KL,2(δL) = π because KL,2(δ) is
decreasing in δ while KL,2(δ) = π is constant. And KL,2(δL) ≤ KL,2(δL) if
and only if 2απ − 2c ≤ π or α ≤ π+2c
2π = eα which holds.
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Then, I can show that KL,2(δ) ≤ KL,2(δ). Again, to establish this result,
it is suﬃcient to show that KL,2(δL) ≤ KL,2(δL) since KL,2(δ) is steeper than
KL,2(δ). But this inequality amounts at απ−2c1−α ≤ 2απ−2c which holds for all
α ≤ eα.
Hence, I have:
KL,2(δ) ≤ KL,2(δ) ≤ KL,2(δ). (48)
It follows that for all K > KL,2(δ), the infringer does not invest. For
K ≤ KL,2(δ), he invests in period 1 provided K ≤ KL,2(δ) and he delays if
K ∈ (KL,2(δ), KL,2(δ)]. This is stated in lemma 9.
♦ Consider then α ∈
heα, eeαi .
I know from the preceding analysis that KL,2(δL) ≥ KL,2(δL) = π and in
addition KL,2(δL) ≥ KL,2(δL). I investigate the condition for both KL,2(δ)
and KL,2(δ) to intersect KL,2(δ) = π at a point δ ∈ [δL, δL]. To that end, I
solve KL,2(δ) = π for δ. This gives δ = 2απ−c−π2απ =
•
•
δ and I solve KL,2(δ) = π
for δ. This also yields δ = 2απ−c−π
2απ =
•
•
δ. The conditions for
•
•
δ ∈ [δL, δL] are:
•
•
δ ≥ δL and
•
•
δ ≤ δL. The first condition amounts at 2απ−c−π2απ ≥
c
2απ or α ≥ eα
while the second condition amounts at 2απ−c−π
2απ ≤
c
π or α ≤
π+c
2(π−c) =
eeα. These
two conditions are clearly satisfied.
Hence, I have:



KL,2(δ) ≥ KL,2(δ) ≥ KL,2(δ) if δ ∈ [δL,
•
•
δ]
KL,2(δ) ≤ KL,2(δ) ≤ KL,2(δ) if δ ∈ [
•
•
δ, δL].
(49)
Defines the kinked curved
•
•
K(δ) by:
•
•
K(δ) =



KL,2(δ) if δ ≤
•
•
δ
KL,2(δ) if δ >
•
•
δ
(50)
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It follows that for all K ≤
•
•
K(δ) the infringer invests in period 1, and
for all K such that K ≤ KL,2(δ) and K ≥
•
•
K(δ) he delays investment until
period 2. For K >
•
•
K(δ) and K > KL,2(δ) he does not invest. This is stated
in lemma 9.
♦ Consider finally α ∈
heeα, 1i .
From the preceding analysis, I know that
•
•
δ ≥ δL. Hence, for all δ ∈
[δL, δL], I have:
KL,2(δ) ≥ KL,2(δ) ≥ KL,2(δ). (51)
It follows that for all K ≤ KL,2(δ) the infringer invests in period 1,
otherwise he does not invest. This is again stated in lemma 9.
¥ Scenario 3: δ ∈ [0, δL].
The analysis is identical to the ”no laches regime”. See Appendix A.1.
On this interval, three functions must be considered: KL,3(δ), KL,3(δ)
and KL,3(δ). The analysis is equivalent to the analysis of the ”no laches”
regime since KL,3(δ) = KN,3(δ), KL,3(δ) = KN,3(δ) and KL,3(δ) = KN,3(δ).
Therefore, it is not necessary to detail the analysis and, following the result
for the no laches regime, I can state that for all K ≤ KL,3 = 2απ, the
infringer invests in period 1. Otherwise, he does not invest. This is stated in
lemma 7.
The following lemma combines the above analysis with the analysis of
litigation conducted in section 3. It gives the exact values of the parameters
for which a specific equilibrium outcome occurs. Figures L1, L2 and L3
capture these features in a livelier manner.
Lemma 20 Equilibrium outcomes under the doctrine of laches).
When the probability of commercial success is high (α ≥ 1
2
),
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• If patent protection is strong (δ ∈ [δL, 1]), the infringer invests in period
1 if the sunk cost is low enough (K ≤ KL,1) and the patentholder
litigates in period 1. If K > KL,1 he does not invest.
• If patent protection is weak (δ ∈ [0, δL], the infringer invests in period
1 if the sunk cost is low enough (K ≤ KL,3) and the patentholder does
not litigate. He does not invest if K > KL,3.
• If patent protection is intermediate (δ ∈ [δL, δL]), the timing of invest-
ment depends on the probability that the innovation is profitable:
— When α ∈
£
1
2
, eα¤ , the infringer invests in period 1 if K ≤ KL,2
and the patentholder litigates in period 1. He delays investment
until period 2 for K ∈ [KL,2, KL,2] and the patentholder does not
litigate. He does not invest if K ≥ KL,2.
— When α ∈
heα, eeαi, the infringer invests in period 1 if K ≤ ••K
and the patentholder litigates in period 1. If K ∈ [
•
•
K,KL,2], the
infringer delays investment and the patentholder does not litigate.
If K >
•
•
K and K > KL,2, the infringer does not invest.
— When α ∈
heeα, 1i ,the infringer invests in period 1 if K ≤ KL,1
and the patentholder litigates in period 1. He does not invest if
K > KL,1.
Appendix B
Appendix B.1: I show that 1
2
≤ bα ≤ bbα ≤ eα ≤ eeα.
I have: bα = π
2(π−c) ;
bbα = π
2π−3c ; eα = π+2c2π and eeα = π+c2(π−c) .
Notice that 1
2
≤ bα if and only if π ≥ π − c which holds. Then, bα ≤ bbα
if and only if 2(π − c) ≥ 2π − 3c which holds as well. And bbα ≤ eα if and
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only if 2π2 ≤ (π+2c)(2π− 3c) which is equivalent to π ≥ 6c which holds by
assumption. Finally, eα ≤ eeα if and only if (π+2c)2(π− c) ≤ (π+ c)2π which
is equivalent to −2c2 ≤ 0. This clearly holds.
I can conclude that 1
2
≤ bα ≤ bbα ≤ eα ≤ eeα. QED.
Appendix B.2. I conduct the comparative analysis between the laches
and the no laches regime, for each of the following intervals: α ∈
hbα, bbαi , α ∈hbbα, eαi , α ∈ heα, eeαi and α ∈ heeα, 1i . I proceed with a graphical comparison,
as in section 5.1.
When α ∈
hbα, bbαi, the relevant graphics to compare are N2 (for the ”no
laches regime) and L1 (for the laches regime). I superpose these two graph-
ics to obtain the following figure. As in Figure 4, the solid lines represent
boundaries between the diﬀerent equilibria in the no laches regime. The dot-
ted lines represent the boundaries in the (new) laches regime. The capital
letters represent parameters configurations that are aﬀected by a switch to
the laches regime. Notice that all these configurations (I, I 0, M , P , J) have
been encountered when analyzing the case α ∈
£
1
2
, bα¤ . Hence, there is no
additional insight when α ∈
hbα, bbαi .
δ
K
I
'I
JM
P
Nδ Lδ Lδ δˆδˆˆ 1
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I repeat this analysis for the case where α ∈
hbbα, eαi. The relevant graph-
ics to compare are now N3 and L1. As shown in the following figure, the
parameters configurations aﬀected by the change of regime (I, I 0, M , P , J)
have been encountered in the case α ∈
£
1
2
, bα¤ :
δ
K
I
'I
JM
P
I
Nδ Lδ Lδ δˆˆ δˆ 1
When α ∈
heα, eeαi I compare N3 and L2. All the parameters configurations
aﬀected by the change of regime (I, I 0, M , P , J) have been analyzed before:
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δK
I
'I
J
M
P
I
Nδ Lδ Lδ δˆˆ δˆ 1
When α ∈
heeα, 1i I compare N3 and L3. Again, all parameters configura-
tions (I, I 0, M , P ) have been encountered before:
δ
K
I
'I
M
P
Nδ Lδ Lδ δˆˆ δˆ 1
Hence, focusing only on α ∈
£
1
2
, bα¤ entails no loss of generality.
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